TheSyllabus

There is indeed a range of positions among the far right. First, we have the stereotypical denier. That position still exists, and until fairly recently was maybe the default way in which the far right-climate nexus was understood by the wider public. But it never captured the full picture, because there have also long been those who accept climate change – and human-caused climate change more specifically.

Regularly, this second position is connected to some core far-right claims – for example, somebody might accept that climate change exists and that human-caused greenhouse gas emissions play a role, and then add that so-called overpopulation should not be ignored.

Other times, far-right actors won’t explicitly reject climate change, and (implicitly) recognize that humans have an influence, but – and after that big “but,” they will reference policy reactions they perceive as hysterical, blaming them for ruining industry, causing unemployment, and so on. This response skepticism also obstructs meaningful engagement with the problem.

That's an ongoing debate. One explanation has to do with “ideological rigor.” Those on the extreme-right end of the far right might be more inclined to accept climate change because they can, for example, connect it to their critique of capitalism. They might be committed to “blood and soil” nationalism and translate their ideologically-charged concern for their homeland into recognition of climate change as a danger. Even though climate change is abstract and global, they take it seriously because it potentially affects their homeland so fundamentally.

However, we still have to be very careful, because one can easily point to extreme-right actors who are outright denialists. This might be connected to crass conspiracy theories. It's a difficult question to answer definitively.

When it comes to populist, radical right actors – for example, parts of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the National Rally in France – there's certainly an obstructionist aspect. And that surely has to do with the dynamics of the political field. These parties are trying to speak to parts of the electorate who are allegedly not being served at the moment. And given that, overall, there is acceptance of climate change in the political field, it makes sense for them to turn climate responses into threats – for example, through talk about deindustrialization.

Of course, they also helped to create those same anxieties to begin with. By performing the crisis, they bring it into being in the minds of their audience. When you look at how these actors communicate in public, there are similarities across different crises. Compare Covid and climate change: these actors use them as opportunities to bring very similar kinds of topics to the fore. The same is true of how they talk about the economy or elites. So, field-related, strategic reasons go hand-in-hand with and emerge against the background of ideological ones – such as their populism and the significance they attach to national sovereignty.

There are. In France, the National Rally seems to engage in little outright denialism and doesn’t dispute the evidence of climate change – which would be primary obstruction. But that doesn't mean there is no response skepticism – a form of secondary obstruction. Just because they don’t fight the scientific evidence, that doesn't mean they are actually helping to address the problem. 

Similarly, in Nordic countries, radical-right political parties have apparently moved away from outright denial, although Sweden still has a strong outright denialist scene. You can also still witness outright denial in Germany, from parts of the AfD. In the UK, the United Kingdom Independence Party and the British National Party were two very loud, very forceful denialist groups.

In Central and Eastern Europe, meanwhile, PiS and Fidesz, as well as Jobbik, set the tone of acceptance. These are prominent examples. The case of Poland and Hungary indicate that the far right in these regions is more likely to accept climate change than their Western counterparts.

Although the South of Europe hasn't been my focus, what you say rings true. From what I hear, outright denialism is not “at home” in the South the way it is further North. That describes the Italian Lega in the European Parliament, as well as the Greek Golden Dawn. The latter is no longer relevant, but they were very open when it came to accepting climate change – especially when compared to other actors on the far right. Vox, too, has (inconsistently!) admitted that climate change is real.

But again, just because far-right actors are not outright denialist, that doesn't mean these parties are helpful, that they support meaningful climate policies. There's been some research about these parties' actual voting patterns; overall, they are still obstructionist. And if you look at what happens when the far right is in government, climate policies do seem to suffer, even if not catastrophically. Most far-right parties are obstructionist in one way or another.

I haven't seen much policy innovation. I’ve studied their discourses in the European Parliament, and there were sometimes counterproposals by, for example, the National Rally, or from the Golden Dawn. These far-right parties had to justify their voting, but they were never very sophisticated in how they did so. Looking at the degrowth debates in some parts of the German far right, visible for example in the New Right magazine Die Kehre, we find complaints about capitalism, about corporations – but there's little about the nitty-gritty of what to do next.

One could imagine the use of technology being important, but I have not seen much change in terms of their discursive strategies. The arguments have remained fairly stable. They are pushing hard to emphasize “deindustrialization” and the dangers climate policy supposedly poses for the economy more generally. But that has long been present, certainly since when I began studying these actors in the early 2010s.

My assumption was that talk about climate refugees or climate migration would come to the fore as the climate crisis unfolds, and as the media starts to report on affected populations’ need to move. But that hasn't happened yet. It doesn't mean it will not become much more prominent at some point, but it hasn't been the major argument made by the far right.

It's complex and there's lots of variety. But even those who accept climate change cannot go down the “mainstream” path. They always have to criticize green, liberal, and left-wing positions, especially when they are embodied by representatives like Thunberg. There's still talk about the allegedly inconsistent policies put forward by “mainstream” actors. The far right likes to target the mainstream’s inability to deal with the realities of climate change, as they see them.

Some of the central actors in contemporary politics do have a populist element, like the AfD and the National Rally. When we call them populist, we are recognizing that they position themselves and “the people” in opposition to an elite, whether national or international. They accuse this elite of failing to understand ordinary people, and to oppress them. The populist actor combats this by ostensibly giving voice to the “will of the people.”

I think this is one of the more substantial arguments that has been directed against international actors – it could be the IPCC, or somebody like Thunberg who travels the globe. But it has also been directed against the national elite, whom they see as aiding these international forces. So, yes, populist claims certainly feature in far-right climate obstructionist rhetoric.

I have never explicitly compared the two, but there do seem to be overlaps in their stances. Many conservative parties make the argument about the need to be rational, to not overreact to climate change, to also consider the nation’s industry and unemployment rates. Those discourses are not restricted to the far right.

In fact, when we talk about addressing climate change, the problem lies less with the far right. There are various reasons why we should try to understand how their climate change communication works within their wider political activism. But, the real problem rests with the “mainstream” parties, and their shortcomings on the climate. At least in Europe, the far right isn't the main reason that too little has been done about climate change.

It’s very relevant. But again, this is not limited to the far right, although it is more typical of those movements. They’re not only trying to defend a lifestyle, but also to protect the identity that comes with it. This identity might include meat consumption, driving big cars with combustion engines, traditional ideas of what it means to be a man – all those kinds of things.

There have certainly been events that concern climate change, and which brought in speakers from different national backgrounds in Europe, such as an “Alternative Climate Symposium” organized by the AfD in 2019. One relevant think tank is EIKE, which has received both media and academic coverage for its climate denialism, and which has connections to players beyond the borders of Germany. Another case of transnational links between far-right actors is the Institut Iliade’s conference in France, which the German New Right attends. Climate change was discussed there in the past.

To stick with the New Right, in France, for example, there's Alain de Benoist. He's not exactly a new voice and has long talked about ecological questions and climate change. 

If we move to Germany, the relevant intellectuals are often younger. Here, Die Kehre is a key publication, which is committed to writing about ecological questions from a far-right perspective. They differ from how far-right parties like the AfD address climate change and other environmental issues, and do draw on a long tradition in far-right thinking.

I can answer for Germany. With regards to a publication like Die Kehre, no. With regards to non-party actors and magazines which may be informally connected to the AfD, yes. In the past, there have been attempts to communicate for farmers – as well as with more general groups like motorists.

Let's go back to these established “mainstream” parties – granted, far-right ideas and far-right parties have become mainstream, but here I’m referring to the classic parties in Europe, the traditional center-Left and the center-Right, perhaps also the Greens and the Liberals. They are the ones who, if they really wanted to, could do something. The far right could object, but it wouldn't make much difference. It's just a matter of numbers. The mainstream parties could still implement policies. So, if we don't manage to stay below 1.5ºC – and that's how it's looking – I wouldn't say it would be because of the far right; it would be because of the “center.”

There have always been people who believe the earth is flat; there will always be people who believe climate change doesn't exist or has nothing to do with humans. It's great that there has been so much attention to this issue of far-right climate obstruction over the last few years, from the media as well as activists. It’s very important to look at these types of climate discourses; they are another piece in the mosaic of far-right activism. We need to understand them because they feed into these exclusionary, anti-elite political stances and arguments, which are made both by party and non-party actors.

I did analyze the Christchurch manifesto, to see what this person in particular was trying to communicate. But at the end of the day, it's not clear if the ecofascist beliefs are the causal aspect that really motivates mass shooters to take up a gun. I can't assess that.

The theme of fear – of foreigners, of the racialized Other – is definitely strong. But it's an unsurprising theme, which gets connected to climate change and environmental issues more generally through various bridges. We know the far right expresses concern for their national landscapes, for their homelands. One can easily connect the dots – again, it's important to do so, to understand how different aspects can come together and are integrated into a far-right worldview – but it doesn't necessarily make these discourses the activating force behind these shootings.

We briefly touched on the differences that exist within the far right. These differences are important, but at the same time, some studies say that what tends to cause opposition to climate policies is populism itself, how “populist” individuals are.

But this is not a consensus view. There are also those who find that climate policy opposition actually does depend on exclusionary and nationalist attitudes. If that's the relevant variable affecting skepticism or obstructionism, then it wouldn't be relevant among left populists. And if you look at the parties' actual communications, it's clear that the populism put forward by the far right is much more aligned with climate obstruction than the populism voiced by actors on the left.